The ‘Oreshnik’ Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
Preliminary Assessment
The ‘Oreshnik’ Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
30 November 2024
Instinctive Analysis
On 21 November 2024, an otherwise regular Ukrainian Air Defence Force press release statement regarding daily operations against Russian air attacks made an unprecedented claim. That unprecedented claim was the accusation that Russian forces had used an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to strike Dnipro city. Several hours after this statement was released, footage, the legitimacy of which was confirmed by BBC Verify, emerged on mainstream media channels showing a strike against the Pivdenmash industrial complex in southwestern Dnipro city by six cluster munition warheads moving at hypersonic speed.
Within 12 hours of the footage being released, official United States military and intelligence sources began commenting on the event. The American assessment was that this was certainly a different kind of weapon being employed by Russian forces – in comparison to the usual short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), cruise missiles and suicide drones used to strike Ukraine – and that, more specifically, it was likely an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) using multiple hypersonic-speed warheads. The significance of the development is evident in the fact that (i.) the new missile was obsessively- discussed in the Western mainstream media, which is usually dismissive of Russian military capabilities, for four days and that (ii.) for the first time, otherwise Ukrainian government-banned footage showing Russian strikes against targets in the country was granted public release for the purposes of assessment by international observers and the open-source intelligence community.
A factor which contributes to the significance of the development is that the attack came around a day after the Ukrainian military was given the green-light by US and British authorities to strike deep inside Russian sovereign territory using US/ British-made guided missiles in addition to also being granted permission to use US/ British- made internationally-banned landmines against Russian ground forces.
It took almost 24 hours before the first official Russian commentary regarding the strike came out. In a televised statement, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed some technical details about the weapon which mostly confirmed conclusions put forth by the earlier-provided American assessment; but most importantly, this new missile was finally given a name – the ‘Oreshnik’. As of yet, no NATO designation or codename exists for this new missile system, an indication that the Russians were able to develop it in relative secrecy given that US intelligence has well-prepared designations and codenames for Russian air weapon systems (aircraft and missiles) that it can observe are in development. In short, the Russians appear to have achieved some degree of surprise with the combat-testing of the Oreshnik against Ukraine.
It is the assessment of the Instinctive Analysis team that the Oreshnik is a very dangerous new weapon – not only because of its so-far perceivable unique capabilities but also because the Russians are willing to use it. The Russians claim it is not a ‘strategic weapon’ – we disagree, it is. Whilst little is still yet known about the Oreshnik, its sudden appearance on the Ukrainian stage in the form of actual combat use, and with a promise by the Russian leadership that it will continue to be used, is significant and worthy of a preliminary assessment report.
Established Facts
The following facts are considered ‘established’ on the grounds that official and or well-informed Western sources agree with official Russian claims that:
• The Oreshnik missile is an IRBM which can be launched from a mobile wheeled platform;
• A single Oreshnik missile can carry a payload of several hypersonic-speed warheads;
• The Oreshnik missile used in the Dnipro strike carried six warheads, each with six sub-munitions;
• The Oreshnik’s payload packages can be either conventional or nuclear;
• The Oreshnik is still an experimental weapon, the current small stockpile (actual size unknown) available to the Russian military being the result of a limited pre-serial production run;
• The speed of the Oreshnik missile is in excess of Mach 10;
• There currently exists no air defence missile system in service with any country’s military capable of reliably intercepting either the Oreshnik or its payload.
Apparent Facts
The following facts are considered ‘apparent’ on the grounds that it is solely claimed by official Russian sources, and yet not formally contested by official and or well- informed Western sources, that:
• The Oreshnik missile is sufficiently tested, including once in combat conditions;
• The Oreshnik missile is cleared for serial production and will likely enter widespread service with Russian forces in the very near future.
Disputed Information
• Official Russian sources claim that the Oreshnik is an entirely new weapon design,1 whilst official US sources argue the Oreshnik is directly derived from the RS-26 Rubzeh missile2 – an ICBM long suspected by Western military analysts of actually being an IRBM.3
• Whilst both official Russian and US sources have designated the Oreshnik as an IRBM, many Ukrainian military sources continue to claim the weapon is an ICBM.
• The Russian leadership claims the Oreshnik will be produced in sufficient numbers to allow for regular use of the weapon in air operations against Ukrainian forces;4 the official US assessment is that whilst the missile may eventually enter common service with the Russian military, its combat use against Ukraine will be rare.5
• Whilst there exists no dispute as to the what the target of the Dnipro strike was (the Pivdenmash aerospace technical complex), there does exist a dispute as to the effectiveness of the strike; official Ukrainian reports claim that the damage caused was insignificant;6 there currently exists no official US or Russian damage assessment; low-resolution satellite images of the Pivdenmash complex dated 24 November (three days after the strike) are available available on Sentinel Hub, however, the quality of the images are too poor for the purposes of a damage assessment; according to a BBC report which cites local eyewitnesses, detonations were heard for three hours after the strike,7 indicating that there must have been secondary explosions; there is a one-minute clip of CCTV footage which shows the missile attack followed by two large secondary explosions about 40 seconds later (see attached video file); the degree to which operations at the complex have been impacted is unclear.
1 https://www.rt.com/russia/608070-putin-oreshnik-tbc/
4 https://www.rt.com/russia/608070-putin-oreshnik-tbc/; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx28dzvxjyjo
7 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx28dzvxjyjo
Summary Analysis
Ultimately, there is not much to summarize beyond the already stated technical capabilities of the Oreshnik missile – the news on the matter is simply that fresh and the available information that little.
It can be said that the footage of the warhead impacts on the Pivdenmash complex are unique in the history of missile strike footage – nothing quite like it has been seen before. The impact of the strike, according to what satellite imagery indicates and what the actual effect on plant operations may be, is likely to remain a disputed subject between different interested parties. We (Instinctive Analysis) argue that higher quality satellite images of the targeted industrial site need to become available before a proper open-source damage assessment can be provided. Regardless of what the actual damage was, it should be remembered that such visually noteworthy striking power as demonstrated by the available footage was nonetheless delivered by only a single missile using a non-nuclear payload.
We consider the Oreshnik to be a dangerous new weapon, first, because of the destructive potential a single missile using only a conventional payload has now been shown to have and, second, because the Russian leadership has demonstrated a clear willingness to use it; possessing a powerful weapon and actually using it are generally two different matters, in this case, it is not – that threshold is clearly surpassable in the Russian military assessment. It should be remembered that ground- launched IRBMs and cruise missiles were banned under a Soviet-US agreement (the INF Treaty, bilaterally enacted 1988, unilaterally withdrawn from by the US in 2019) because both nations understood the paranoia such weapons create due to their ability to be launched in a pre-emptive first strike with considerably reduced risk of detection compared to ICBMs and air-launched cruise missiles. Strategic weapons security has always worked on the principal that one side will always be able to see the other side’s attack coming with ample time for retaliation – the IRBM was banned for this reason. Be it the case that ICBMs can travel further and carry a heavier payload, these weapons nonetheless stay parked on their launch platforms; during the Cold War, the same was true of IRBMs – today that is no longer so. In the assessment of the world’s largest nuclear-armed power, IRBMs are now authorized for use, and we believe that this is a dangerous precedent because such a policy may very well open the door for the relaxation of once sacred rules regarding the strict non-use of ICBMs. Whether the payload is nuclear or conventional is irrelevant, the missile itself is the precedent for escalation.
Moscow insists the Oreshnik’s combat deployment is an acute response to the Western decision to allow Ukrainian forces to use US/ British-made advanced missile systems to strike within the sovereign borders of the Russian Federation; the West argues that Ukraine has a right to do so because of the violation of its sovereignty by Russian forces. We do not offer commentary in regards to either position. In the objective military and geopolitical assessment of the matter, all we can do is point out that a cycle of escalation between the nuclear-armed Western powers and Russia has begun – one that is comparable to the missile proliferation of the 1950s and opening years of the 1960s, which itself almost ended in direct confrontation by way of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Understanding this, we agree with official Western assessments that the use of the Oreshnik missile against Dnipro city carried with it a political message – a warning to both Ukraine and its international backers. We concur with the assessment of both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian commentators that the missile’s use is tied to Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine protocols and the lowering of it’s threshold for strategic weapons use. We believe that Western and Ukrainian officials are surprised by the strike, though not overwhelmed with shock. We believe that the Dnipro strike on its own will not cause the US and British leadership to reverse course on their decision to allow Ukrainian forces to use US/ British guided missiles to strike inside Russian territory, though it may leave them attempting to calculate what further precedent-setting actions Russia could undertake in the near future. We have no intention to make a Statement of Strategic Prediction at the present
time.
Personal Commentary ( Ryan Dawson)
Instinctive Analysis initially wanted to provide a damage assessment of the Pivdenmash complex based on satellite imagery from Sentinel Hub, dated 24 November 2024 (three days after the strike). Whilst we are both privately convinced that we can see strike damage which aligns with available footage of the attack, we ultimately decided not to do this on the grounds that (i.) the satellite images are of very low quality, making it hard to distinguish between impact-scarred earth and autumn foliage and that because of this (ii.) any critics of the assessment have a lot of room to instill doubt, leading to petty arguments that are not worth our time. We suspect that the images were intentionally edited – specifically, that subtle pixel distortion and color saturation was imposed; however, we cannot prove this suspicion. It is best that we exercise professional modesty and patience.
I believe that unedited, higher-resolution satellite images will eventually become available – likely by accident. Sentinel Hub is open to the public, though it is still subject to the same military-sensitive censorship rules that Google Maps abides by. ImageSat International and Maxar absolutely cannot be counted on to provide the images we seek because they directly serve the US federal government and its supporting defense and intelligence agencies (this is even stated on the websites of these companies). ImageSat and Maxar are effectively private versions of what the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly, National Imagery and Mapping Agency) is, and just like it, are subject to the same military-sensitive censorship protocols (plan to talk to Larry Johnson more about this, he is former CIA, he can explain how the NIMA/ NGIA went from being a relatively objective information source to a tool of the US establishment). However, it is my belief that high-quality images of the industrial site will eventually leak from Google Maps when a member of the company’s censorship team simply forgets to edit updated pictures. This has happened before, and indeed, quite recently as well.8 It is also possible that the Russian military will conduct further Oreshnik strikes in the future, and there will be no relevant need to obsess over a damage assessment of the Pivdenmash attack.